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The new economic geography
Abstract
Recently, the 'new economic geography' literature has developed as a theory of the emergence of large
agglomerations which relies on increasing returns to scale and transportation costs. This literature builds
on diverse intellectual traditions. It combines the insights of traditional regional science with those of
modern trade theory and thus attempts to provide an integrative approach to interregional and
international trade. The paper surveys this literature and discusses its relation to earlier approaches to
similar topics.
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Abstract 
 
 
Recently, the “new economic geography” literature has developed as a theory of the 
emergence of large agglomerations which relies on increasing returns to scale and 
transportation costs. This literature builds on diverse intellectual traditions. It combines 
the insights of traditional regional science with those of modern trade theory and thus 
attempts to provide an integrative approach to interregional and international trade. The 
paper surveys this literature and discusses its relation to earlier approaches to similar 
topics.  
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1. Introduction 
Perhaps surprisingly, for a long time international economists more or less ignored such 
concepts as distance, space and transportation costs. Neither Heckscher-Ohlin theory nor 
new trade theory (e.g. Helpman and Krugman 1985) relies on the inclusion of these 
factors. Nevertheless, there were some early attempts to investigate the role of distance 
between and within nations for the analysis of international trade. For instance, in his 
“Theory of Interregional and International Trade”, Bertil Ohlin himself analyzed how 
transportation costs affect patterns of trade and specialization. For him, “international 
trade theory cannot be understood except in relation to and as part of the general location 
theory, to which the lack of mobility of goods and factors has equal relevance” (Ohlin 
1933, p.141-142). Nevertheless, for decades to come, the role of distance and space was 
almost exclusively the remit of regional economists. Recently, this has been changing. 
Since the publication of Paul Krugman’s “Geography and Trade” in 1991, a burgeoning 
literature has developed under the heading “new economic geography”. In the following, 
I shall survey the new economic geography literature and evaluate its contribution 
relative to earlier work on similar topics. 
Like earlier works in regional science, the new economic geography deals with variants 
of one basic question, namely, which factors have influenced and continue to influence 
the geographical distribution of economic activity? For instance, why did European 
manufacturing concentrate in such regions as the Midlands, Northern France, the Ruhr 
Valley and Northern Italy in the early stages of the industrial revolution? Why has this 
spatial distribution been so remarkably robust for a long time? What have been the causes 
of recent changes in the pattern of manufacturing activity?1 Corresponding questions can 
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be asked for the United States, where, for a long time, manufacturing activity was 
concentrated in a comparatively small part of the country, in the manufacturing belt 
between the Great Lakes and New England, before it gradually shifted to the South and 
the West (see Hoover 1948, ch. 9, Fuchs 1962, Krugman 1991c). 
An evident argument in the explanation of geographical concentration is that certain 
regions enjoy “first-nature” advantages over others, such as superior endowment with 
natural resources or transportation facilities such as rivers or harbours.2 Often, such 
factors reasonably explain why some regions face a particular concentration of economic 
activity. However, there are many cases where regions without obvious natural 
advantages develop into economic centers. In such cases, additional arguments need to be 
invoked to understand concentration. 
Reduced to its essence, the new economic geography is a theory of the emergence of 
large agglomerations which relies on increasing returns to scale and transportation costs,3 
and emphasizes linkages between firms and suppliers as well as between firms and 
consumers.4 The basic story underlying this type of analysis can be sketched as follows. 
Increasing returns to scale tend to foster geographical concentration of production of each 
good. When transportation costs play a role, attractive locations for production are those 
which are close to markets and suppliers, other things being equal. Finally, concentration 
of production in some location tends to attract the mobile factors of production. Workers 
have better job and consumption opportunities where production is concentrated. The 
resulting concentration of the labour force leads to more demand for consumption goods 
in that location, which makes this region more attractive for producers. Once a region has 
a high share of production, this pattern is likely to reinforce itself: a so-called second-
nature advantage for the dominant region develops, that is, the region becomes attractive 
for firms because so many other firms already produce there (rather than because of 
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superior resource endowment). In other words, success breads success. Working against 
these centripetal forces which strengthen agglomerations are centrifugal forces. For 
instance, concentration of productive activities in one region may drive land rents and 
housing prices up, and may lead to environmental problems. Also, if immobile factors of 
productions remain in peripheral areas, firms from the center may want to move there to 
serve these areas. The population and production patterns result from a balancing of these 
centrifugal forces and the centripetal forces. 
I shall proceed as follows. In section 2, I shall trace the intellectual roots of the new 
economic geography literature. The remaining sections analyze the new economic 
geography in more detail. Section 3 summarizes Krugman’s model (1991b, 1991c, 1992) 
which focuses on the linkages between producers and workers/consumers. I also 
highlight some of the missing elements in this model, which have been the starting point 
for further work. Section 4 presents some of these additional contributions. Section 5 
discusses those modifications of the basic Krugman model that include backward and 
forward linkages between firms and there suppliers, in more detail, and explores the 
applications of the modified framework to international trade theory. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 The new economic geography — background 
To sum up the discussion of the last section, new economic geography models of 
economic agglomeration have the following elements. First, they emphasize advantages 
of concentration which are unrelated to natural endowments. Hence, arguments of 
circular causation play a role, that is, dominance of regions is regarded as a self-
reinforcing process that can be sparked off by a small event. Second, the whole approach 
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has a distinct general equilibrium flavor. The interactions between different markets, 
between firms and their suppliers and customers, and the dual role of workers as 
production factors and consumers are emphasized. Third, the centripetal forces favoring 
agglomerations are weakened by counterveiling centrifugal forces. Fourth, 
microfoundations play are important. In particular, positive externalities are not assumed, 
they are derived from the interplay of transportation costs, increasing returns to scale and 
factor mobility. 
No single one of these aspects is new to spatial economics. This is particularly true for 
the point that there are advantages from geographical concentration of economic activity. 
For firms within industries, this point has been made by Marshall (1920, ch. 10) who 
distinguishes between advantages from having a larger local labour pool, from employing 
common non-traded inputs and from knowledge spillovers.5 The Marshallian arguments 
do not rely on general equilibrium interactions; in fact, they are particularly suitable for 
explaining small-scale concentration of firms within specific industries. They may 
explain why cities or small areas without specific natural advantages in the production of 
certain goods become highly specialized in these goods: the more or less arbitrary 
decision of a small number of firms to locate in one region may induce others to follow. 
However, they can probably not explain the existence of vast agglomerations with firms 
from different industries. 
Thus, apart from emphasizing (Marshallian) “external economies of concentration of a 
particular industry”, scholars such as Ohlin (1933, p.203) also pointed to the “economies 
of concentration of industries in general”. In a similar vein, Hoover (1948, p. 3/4) 
maintained that “... economic interrelations between different industries and firms play an 
important part in shaping the pattern of location as a whole” and consequently “... even in 
the absence of any initial differentiation,..., patterns of specialization and concentration of 
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activities would inevitably appear”, the reason being not only advantages from 
“concentrating certain kinds of business in relatively few locations”, but also from 
“proximity of related processes” and from the closeness of consumers and producers. 
Second-nature advantages of concentration resulting from interactions between different 
sectors are also familiar from the development literature of the 1950s and 1960s which 
aimed at explaining why some regions attract more production and population than 
others. Stories of circular causation were as popular as they are in the new economic 
geography literature, and the mechanisms described were similar to those sketched 
above. For instance, Hirschman (1963, p. 100) emphasized that there are “... backward 
linkage effects, i.e., every non-primary activity will induce attempts to supply through 
domestic production the inputs needed in that activity” and “forward linkage effects, i.e., 
every activity that does not by its nature cater exclusively to final demands, will induce 
attempts to utilize its outputs as inputs in some new activity”. Hirschman’s focus is on 
how best to exploit these linkages for development strategies. Myrdal (1957, ch. 3) used 
similar kinds of arguments to explain persistent dominance of regions in Third World 
countries. “Backwash effects” reinforce the dominance of successful cities, for instance, 
by inducing selective migration of younger and possibly relatively well qualified 
workers. In short, the older (mostly qualitative) literature was well aware of the nature of 
centripetal forces.6 This literature usually regarded the existence of these forces as 
problematic, both for the center and the periphery. For instance, Friedmann and Alonso 
(1963, p/3) hold that “... centers not only grow so rapidly as to create problems of an 
entirely new order, but they also act as suction pumps pulling into the more dynamic 
elements from the more static regions”. 
The idea that tendencies towards concentration are reduced by various centrifugal forces 
is not exactly new either. For instance, Ohlin (1933) stated that deglomerating forces 
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such as transportation costs, land rents and high labour prices limit the extent of 
agglomeration.7 Similarly, in his central place theory which attempts to explain 
regularities in the distribution of urban centers in Southern Germany, Christaller (1933, 
p. 28) highlighted the tradeoff between scale economies as sources of agglomeration and 
high rents and wages as counterveiling forces, and asks which geographical patterns are 
likely to emerge from this interplay. Myrdal’s backwash effects were partly offset by 
“spread effects”: growth in centers may induce growth in some peripheral regions if these 
regions are needed to supply the centers, for instance because they have good resource 
bases. More recently, formal models in urban economics have addressed the interaction 
of centripetal and centrifugal forces. For instance, Henderson (1974) assumes localization 
economies in the spirit of Marshall as centripetal forces, and he considers urban land 
rents as centrifugal forces.8 
Like other recent contributions to Urban Economics, Henderson’s paper has solid 
microfoundations. However, locational externalities are merely assumed. While this is 
helpful to investigate their consequences, it says nothing about their causes.  
So what, if anything, is new about the new economic geography? Indeed, some critics 
maintain that the contribution is very limited. Some regional economists, in particular, 
argue that Krugman (1991c) is old wine in new bottles, and that he restates what has been 
familiar in the field for decades, but somehow manages to make more people listen than 
others before him. Indeed, good marketing is certainly an important part of the story. One 
achievement of the new economic geography literature is that, thanks to these marketing 
efforts, it has reminded mainstream economists that some (old) ideas from regional 
economics are interesting. However, there are some reasons to believe that the 
contribution of the new literature goes beyond this.  
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First, in a limited sense, the new economic geography adds something to regional 
economics itself. Even though neither centripetal and centrifugal forces nor general 
equilibrium considerations and microfoundations are unknown to regional economists, 
until recently there was no single approach that emphasizes all of these points in a 
coherent framework. This is mainly because increasing returns to scale are crucial to the 
explanation of agglomeration patterns.9 Therefore, traditional Arrow-Debreu type general 
equilibrium approaches are unsuitable for issues of economic geography, because they 
rely on convex technology sets. The new economic geography uses a more recent 
modeling framework, introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which is known for its 
applications to trade theory (see Krugman 1979). This model sacrifices generality for 
tractability. It uses a convenient assumption on market structure (monopolistic 
competition) to avoid the problems associated with price-taking behavior when there are 
increasing returns to scale, without getting into the intricacies of strategic interaction. It 
employs very specific functional forms for consumer preferences, as will be described in 
the next section. Thanks to this ingenious model, the new economic geography offers a 
convenient framework for the rigorous investigation of macro level spatial economics, 
which has been missing so far. 
Second, and more importantly, with its emphasis on the fact that “...countries both 
occupy and exist in space” (Krugman 1991c, p.2), the new economic geography has 
certainly contributed to a better understanding of international trade theory. In this 
respect, it goes beyond the most notable intellectual ancestor, Ohlin (1933). While Ohlin 
made many important points concerning the relationships between transportation costs 
and trade,10 the new methods appear to lead to new insights about some particularly 
relevant economic questions of our time. The most conspicuous recent tendencies in the 
world economy have been increases in regional integration, fundamental changes in the 
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distribution of manufacturing activity, and a rapid increase in foreign direct investment, 
and there is little doubt that these processes will continue for some time. As will be 
sketched in section 5, the new literature has something to say about the causes and 
consequences of these developments. 
To sum up, many of the ideas from new economic geography are familiar from regional 
economics and from informal approaches to trade and development theory. The specific 
modelling approach, however, has some new elements which are worth a more careful 
discussion. 
3. Second Nature Advantages of Agglomeration - The Basic Model 
I shall now present a model by Krugman (1991b, 1991c) that is designed to show how 
large-scale agglomerations can emerge from the interaction of increasing returns and 
transportation costs. On a general level, the model allows to investigate what effects 
different factors have on the robustness of agglomerations. Most of the contributions we 
shall consider in the following are closely related to this model. I shall discuss it in some 
detail. 
Assumptions  
Consider an economy with two sectors, manufacturing and agriculture. The agricultural 
sector produces a single homogeneous (numéraire) good under perfect competition; the 
total quantity is CA . The manufacturing sector is characterized by monopolistic 
competition. A large number of potential firms can each produce differentiated products 
i=1,...,I. These products are symmetric in the sense that consumers do not prefer one 
product to another one. However, consumers have preference for variety; in particular, 
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starting from any consumption vector a unit of a product that is not yet consumed is 
always preferred to an additional unit of a product that is already consumed.  
A functional form that captures symmetry and preference for variety is given as follows. 
Let ci  be the quantity consumed of product i. Then the utility of the representative 
consumer derived from c1,...,cI( ) is given in the CES-form 
CM = ciσ −1σ
i=1
I∑⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎤ ⎦ ⎥ 
σ σ −1
, (1) 
where σ > 1 (see for instance Krugman 1991b). Total utility from consuming a vector 
c1,...,cI( ) of manufacturing goods and CA  units of the agricultural good is given as 
U CA,CM( )= CMμCA1− μ , (2) 
where μ ∈ 0,1( ). Checking through the first-order conditions of the household’s 
maximization problem shows that with this specification of utility, the share of consumer 
expenditures devoted to manufacturing goods in household equilibrium is μ  and the 
elasticity of substitution between different manufacturing goods is constant (σ ). 
To simplify further, assume that the only production factor in the economy is labour. 
However, there are two types of labour, workers who produce the manufactured goods 
and farmers who produce the agricultural good. The supply of agricultural 
(manufacturing) labour is given exogenously as LA LM( ); farmers never become workers 
or vice versa. To simplify assume that the share of manufacturing workers in the 
population equals μ , the share of manufacturing in  consumer expenditure. The 
agricultural sector works with constant returns to scale. Each variety of the 
manufacturing good is produced with increasing returns to scale, more precisely, with 
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positive fixed costs and constant marginal costs. These costs are identical across different 
manufacturing products. 
Geography enters the model in the simplest conceivable fashion. The economy consists 
of two distinct regions, each of which is treated as a single point. Suppose for the 
moment that both types of labour are totally immobile, so that the distribution of workers 
and farmers across regions is fixed. The transportation of manufactured goods between 
regions is costly. For analytical convenience, Krugman uses exogenous iceberg 
transportation costs, that is, he assumes that a certain fraction of the goods does not reach 
its destination.11 More precisely, suppose τ  is a positive constant between 0 and 1. Then, 
of any unit of the good transported from region 1 to region 2 or vice versa, only 1-τ  units 
arrive at the destination. Therefore, τ  parametrizes transportation costs: the greater the 
losses from transportation, i.e., the greater the fraction of the “iceberg” that “melts” in the 
process of transportation. Transportation costs for agricultural goods are assumed to be 
non-existent (see Krugman 1991b, fn.2 for a discussion of this point).  
The behavioral assumptions are as follows. Consumers maximize their utility functions 
U CA,CM( ) given their budget constraints. There is free entry for firms; and firms 
maximize profits. This completes the description of the assumptions. 
When do agglomerations arise? 
Given this set-up, Krugman shows how manufacturing is distributed across regions. In 
particular, he investigates under which circumstances agglomerations arise, that is, under 
which circumstances the entire manufacturing population will concentrate in one region. 
Several intermediate results are helpful here. First, for a large number of manufacturing 
products, the demand elasticity is approximately constant and the same as the elasticity of 
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substitution. As a result, profit maximizing firms set a constant mark-up over marginal 
costs. Second, because of increasing returns to scale, each firm produces only one 
product. Third, with free entry profits are zero. Fourth, because of the symmetry of the 
problem each firm produces at the same output level in equilibrium. The equilibrium 
output of each firm is a positive function of the fixed costs and the elasticity of 
substitution, and a negative function of marginal costs. The number of firms in a region is 
a positive function of its manufacturing labour supply, and a negative function of both 
fixed and marginal costs. These results are intuitive: with a high elasticy of substitution, 
consumers do not value variety very much, so there will be a small number of large firms 
in equilibrium, and this effect will be stronger when fixed costs are high. High marginal 
costs obviously reduce the output society can produce with a given labour supply, which 
implies that a small number of firms will be producing low outputs. 
Using these intermediate results, Krugman goes on to analyze the centripetal and 
centrifugal forces in this model. To this end, he introduces labour mobility. For 
simplicity, he assumes that, while agricultural labour continues to be immobile, 
manufacturing labour always moves towards the region that offers the higher present real 
wage; more precisely, the population of manufacturing workers moves to the high wage 
location at a speed that is proportional to the present wage differential.12 In equilibrium, 
both regions must either offer the same manufacturing wage or the manufacturing 
population must be concentrated in a region offering the higher real wage. Under which 
conditions can a concentration of the entire manufacturing activity in one location (the 
center) arise in equilibrium?  
For such a constellation to be robust, no firm must have an incentive to build a plant in 
the periphery, that is, the location without manufacturing. There are two reasons why 
such a deviation might be unprofitable, both related to transportation costs. First, the firm 
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must induce manufacturing workers from the center to work in the periphery. As these 
workers will have to import most consumption goods from the center, the costs of living 
are higher in the periphery. As a result, the firm must pay higher wages, which drives up 
the output price. Second, the majority of the firm’s customers live in the center. Serving 
them from the periphery involves transportation costs, another reason to stay in the 
center. On the other hand, the agricultural population in the periphery can be served 
cheaper if the firm produces in the periphery. Basically, an agglomeration equilibrium 
results when the last, centrifugal, effect is small relative to the first two, centripetal, 
effects. It remains to be shown what determines whether centripetal or centrifugal forces 
dominate. Specifically, which effects do transportation costs, the size of the 
manufacturing sector and consumer preferences for variety have on the robustness of 
agglomerations? 
Without transportation costs, location does not matter in this set-up. There are neither 
centripetal nor centrifugal forces, so that the locational pattern is indeterminate. If 
transportation costs are very high, an agglomeration becomes unlikely: it is prohibitively 
costly to serve the periphery from the center, and deviating from an agglomeration may 
be a profitable strategy. An agglomeration can only arise if transportation costs are 
positive, but so small that serving the periphery from the center is a feasible alternative to 
local production. 
The size of the manufacturing sector, as measured through the share of manufacturers in 
consumer expenditures, or equivalently, through the share of manufacturing workers in 
the population, has two effects which work in the same direction. For a high share of 
manufacturing in consumer expenditure, the extra wage necessary to compensate workers 
for living in the periphery is high, since a large quantity of manufacturing goods have to 
be imported. In addition, in this scenario, the agricultural population and hence the size 
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of the market in the periphery will be small, which will further weaken the centrifugal 
forces. 
Finally, the elasticity of substitution matters. First note that there is a close relationship 
between the elasticity of substitution and economies of scale. In equilibrium, σ /(σ -1) 
equals the ratio of average cost to marginal cost, a common measure of economies of 
scale.13  Hence, a low elasticity of substitution tends to go along with high economies of 
scale, which makes it less attractive to serve the smaller market locally. 
To sum up: with higher transportation costs, an increasingly important manufacturing 
sector, and more significant economies of scale, agglomerations become more robust. 
The determinants of the manufacturing pattern 
Agglomeration is not the only possible equilibrium in this set-up. Krugman (1992) uses 
numerical simulations to show which equilibrium constellations can arise as a function of 
various exogenous factors. For instance, he investigates how transportation costs affect 
the equilibrium distribution of manufacturing over regions. Suppose region 1 has a 
slightly larger share of agricultural population, and the other parameter values are 
suitably chosen. Then, for relatively high transportation costs, there is an equilibrium 
such that both regions have some manufacturing, but region 1 has a higher manufacturing 
share than region 2. This reflects the fact that the larger market is more attractive for 
manufacturing firms. As transportation costs fall, it becomes more attractive to serve 
region 2 from the larger market. The share of region 1 grows. For lower values, a new 
equilibrium emerges where all manufacturing is concentrated in region 1. Finally, for 
very low values of transportation costs, this equilibrium is unique: the advantages of 
concentrating production dominate over the advantage of being close to the peripheral 
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market; because of the slight asymmetry in agricultural population, region 1 is the better 
location for production. Krugman argues that this is roughly consistent with the empirical 
observation that the development of railroads to Southern Italy in the nineteenth century 
which exposed the local industry to competition from the North eventually led to its 
collapse.14 
Manufacturing patterns also depend on the distribution of the farming population. If 
region 1’s share of the agricultural population is sufficiently high, and the other 
parameters have suitable values,15 all manufacturing will be concentrated there in the 
unique equilibrium, because centrifugal forces coming from the desire to serve location 2 
are small. As the share decreases, the system goes through a sequence of bifurcations, 
that is, discontinuous changes in the equilibrium structure. First an additional equilibrium 
emerges with some manufacturing in region 2. As region 1’s share of the agricultural 
population decreases, this is the only equilibrium. Next, a new equilibrium emerges 
without any production in region 1. Finally, for a sufficiently low agriculture share, this 
becomes the only equilibrium. 
Krugman argues that the move of the manufacturing industry to California around 1900 
might be explained by an increase in the state’s agricultural base, where “agriculture” is 
taken somewhat loosely to apply to the oil industry, which is definitely not footloose and 
hence similar to the agricultural sector of his model. Given the initial situation where 
(almost) all manufacturing was concentrated in the east (region 1), the oil industry had to 
reach a critical mass for a new equilibrium with some footloose production to emerge in 
California (region 2). 
Both stories are nice illustrations of the principles, not more. Krugman makes no serious 
attempts to compare them with other possible explanations. Therefore, not everyone 
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agrees about their relevance. In direct response to Krugman, Rauch (1993b) for instance 
has argued that cheap labour and the invention of air-conditioning played a more 
important role in the move of American manufacturing to the South and West.16 
The basic model — insights and limitations 
Summing up, the main insights of the model are as follows. First, suppose two regions 
start out (almost) identically by nature, in the sense that no region has a superior resource 
base or technology or a larger consumer market. Then an agglomeration of 
manufacturing can develop endogenously in one of the regions. In this development, 
history matters. Due to minor historical events, small initial differences may lead to a 
core-periphery structure. Second, the structure of the equilibrium set depends on 
transportation costs, agricultural shares, etc. in a fairly complex way: for some parameter 
values, manufacturing will always be evenly distributed in equilibrium; for others, the 
equilibrium set contains only the two full agglomeration equilibria; for yet others, all 
three equilibria exist and are locally stable. Continuous parameter changes may lead to 
discontinuous change. In particular, integration favors agglomeration. Third, whether 
agglomeration develops, depends on the interplay of different forces. Positive demand 
externalities lead to centripetal forces favoring agglomeration. The main centrifugal force 
identified here is the desire to keep the transportation costs of serving the periphery low. 
 
4 Modifications of the Basic Model 
While the basic Krugman model captures important aspects of the evolution of spatial 
patterns, it relies on a number of assumptions, which, if relaxed, lead to additional 
insights. The following seven assumptions are worth exploring in more detail. 
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(1) There are no direct negative externalities between firms (e.g. due to pollution or 
congestion). 
(2)  There is no market for housing and land. 
(3) Households are indifferent between regions offering identical wages; in particular, 
they do not take into account such issues as pollution or the value of amenities 
(landscape, climate, etc). 
(4) There are only two regions. 
(5) The dynamics of locational choice are not derived explicitly from forward-looking 
optimizing behavior. 
(6) No region has a superior resource base or technology. 
(7) There are no intermediate goods. 
As will argued in more detail below, relaxing assumptions (1)-(3) adds new centrifugal 
forces. Dropping (4), that is, adding more regions, leads to more complex agglomeration 
patterns, and it also makes the framework applicable to new questions. Relaxing (5) is 
important because it is not obvious how strongly the result depends on the ad-hoc 
adjustment process postulated in the basic model. Without assumption (6) some 
interesting efficiency questions arise, which are absent in the basic model. Abandoning 
(7), i.e., introducing intermediate goods leads to additional backward and forward 
linkages which I shall deal with in section 5. In the remainder of this section, I shall 
confine myself to modification (1)-(6). 
Additional Centripetal Forces 
The centrifugal forces in Krugman’s original model reflect the desire of firms to serve the 
periphery. In this section, we briefly indicate how other authors have introduced 
 19
alternative centrifugal forces, such as negative technological externalities, urban land 
rents, and preferences for quality of life. 
Brakman et al. (1994) modify the basic Krugman model by introducing negative 
technological externalities. To this end, they take a multi-region version of the basic 
Krugman model described in section 3, and add the following technological assumption. 
The fixed and the marginal costs associated with the production of any variety of the 
good depend positively on the number of firms in the location. This captures the idea of 
congestion effects. Not surprisingly, the nature of the equilibrium set usually changes. 
The negative congestion externalities make production in the dominant manufacturing 
region excessively costly, so that agglomeration is usually not complete and firms will 
therefore find it profitable to move to the less congested periphery. The findings of the 
authors are one way to explain the observation that a complete concentration of 
manufacturing in one region rarely occurs; and that even peripheral regions usually 
contain some manufacturing.17 
Urban land rents and commuting costs are the centrifugal force in a paper by Livas-
Elizondo and Krugman (1996). Unlike the models introduced before, this model operates 
without the assumption that a region is a dimensionless point. Instead, farming and 
housing are space-consuming activities. With this modification, agglomerations have to 
offer higher wages to compensate for commuting costs and land rents. To capture this 
effect, regions are modeled as long, narrow cities, i.e., as intervals of the real line. 
Production in each region takes place in the center of the interval. Within each city, the 
population is distributed evenly. There are commuting costs that are increasing in the 
distance from the center. Land rents offset these commuting costs: agents who live close 
to the center have to pay higher land rents, so that in equilibrium the sum of land rents 
and commuting costs is constant within each region. The authors assume that a 
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concentration of manufacturing workers in a region results in a greater length of the city, 
which drives up commuting costs and rents and therefore reduces the likelihood of 
agglomeration. 
Preferences for quality of life are present in a paper by Asilis and Rivera-Batiz (1994). In 
their model, consumers have preferences over consumption goods as in the basic model. 
In addition, however, they also have preferences as to where they want to live relative to 
the center of the region (which is modeled as an interval); in particular the authors allow 
for the possibility that consumers have preferences for living far away from the center to 
escape from pollution. However, these preferences have to be weighed against higher 
costs of living resulting from the costs of transporting manufacturing goods. 
Nevertheless, the result of the trade-off may reduce the strong forces for agglomeration 
present in models without preferences for location.18 
Multi-Region Models 
One of the distinctive features of the basic Krugman model is that there are only two 
locations. The main insights generated in this framework about the role of history and the 
relation between transportation costs, scale economies and agglomeration patterns are 
robust to the relaxation of this assumption. Yet, new questions can be addressed in multi-
region models.  
First, with many potential locations, agglomeration and decentralization are not the only 
possible equilibria. In particular, multiple agglomerations in different regions are 
conceivable as equilibria. This raises a series of questions: Can anything general be said 
about the number of agglomerations in equilibrium? Are there any typical patterns in the 
locations of these equilibria? Second, with more than two regions it makes sense to 
introduce differences in transportation costs between different regions. For instance, in a 
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three-region model two regions can be regarded as different regions within the 
boundaries of one state, while the third region may be a different country. The 
assumption of relatively low transportation costs between the first two regions can then 
be interpreted as the absence of trade barriers (see e.g. Livas-Elizondo and Krugman 
1996). In such a framework, one can investigate how trade barriers affect manufacturing 
patterns within countries. There are two distinct types of multi-region models, namely 
models with finitely many locations and models with a continuum of locations. 
Krugman (1993b, 1994) addresses the case of a finitely number of locations. He 
generalizes the basic model in a straightforward fashion to an arbitrary finite number of 
regions (see also Krugman 1992).  To solve the resulting equilibrium equations, 
numerical simulations are necessary. Krugman illustrates this for the case of twelve 
equidistant regions. Given various initial distributions of manufacturing in these regions 
and an appropriate generalization of the process of adjustment to regional wage 
differentials,19 he checks for the resulting final distributions. It turns out that a great 
number of equilibrium constellations exist, which share common features. The typical 
equilibrium involves agglomeration, but usually in more than one region. In most cases, 
two agglomerations in almost diametrically opposed locations emerge. On rare occasions, 
there are three agglomerations. The three insights from the two-region model stated at the 
end of section 3 are essentially robust to the addition of further regions: asymmetry 
between regions can emerge endogenously so that history matters; for different 
parameters different types of equilibria emerge; and the interplay of centrifugal and 
centripetal forces determines whether or not an agglomeration occurs. 
The most interesting idea added by this extension relates to the question of where 
agglomerations might occur. Simulations suggest there is a “principle of maximum 
differentiation”: when both transportation costs and increasing returns are strong enough 
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for multiple agglomerations to result in equilibrium, these agglomerations tend to keep 
away from each other.20 Unfortunately, these models lack transparency — at least in the 
published versions of the above papers, it is hard to determine what exactly drives the 
results. 
An alternative is the case where the space of possible locations is a continuum, which 
Krugman (1993a) considers.21 He modifies the basic set-up by assuming that 
manufacturing firms can choose their location in the entire unit interval.22 He assumes 
that the agricultural population is distributed evenly across space and that transportation 
costs are an increasing function of the distance between the firm and the customers. 
With this modification, central locations have an initial advantage: the closer an interval 
is to the center, the lower are the transportation costs of serving an evenly distributed 
population. Nevertheless, the center is usually not the only possible equilibrium. After 
noting that for sufficiently high transportation costs, equilibria with only one 
agglomeration do not always exist, Krugman goes on to show which locations are 
suitable for such monocentric equilibria in cases where they do exist.23 The typical set of 
equilibria which can be calculated in this fashion consists of the center of the unit interval 
and locations to both side of the center which are sufficiently close to the center. 
The intuition is as follows. If only the costs of serving the agricultural population 
mattered, only the mid-point of the interval could be an equilibrium: in any other 
situation firms would have an incentive to move to the mid-point to economize on 
transportation costs. However, if an agglomeration has formed slightly to the left or right 
of the center, second-nature advantages as described in section 3 may render such an 
agglomeration stable. With the entire manufacturing population concentrated in the 
agglomeration, it is cheaper to serve it from this point than from the middle of the 
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interval. Not surprisingly, the size of the equilibrium set is increasing in the share of 
manufacturing goods in spending: the more important the positive externalities, the less 
attractive it is to move away from any existing agglomeration. Similarly, a lower 
elasticity of substitution (and hence a higher degree of scale economies in equilibrium), 
increases the equilibrium set. In other words, second nature is more likely to dominate 
first nature if the share of footloose production is high and economies of scale are high.  
The introduction of asymmetry between regions therefore helps to obtain a partial answer 
to the question of where agglomerations form: while externalities produce a certain 
ambiguity in the exact location, relatively central locations are more likely to emerge as 
industrial agglomerations because of their transportation-cost advantages. 
The effects of trade liberalization on the internal geography of a nation 
Another example of a framework with more than two regions is the above-mentioned 
paper by Livas-Elizondo and Krugman (1996). The author’s goal is to explain why many 
of the world’s largest cities have developed in Third World countries, sometimes in spite 
of government effort to encourage decentralization. More precisely, Livas-Elizondo and 
Krugman give a possible explanation why there is a negative relation between 
geographical concentration within a country and the degree of trade liberalization of this 
country. This empirical relation is apparent from an investigation of 85 countries by Ades 
and Glaeser (1995). It has also been pointed out by Hanson (1994) who attributes the 
dominance of Mexico City in national manufacturing to the country’s import substitution 
policy, and the recent gains of other regions to the liberalization policy in the eighties.  
To explain such phenomena, Livas-Elizondo and Krugman use a modified version of the 
basic model. Their model works with the assumptions on goods, technology, market 
structure and preferences that are familiar from the Krugman model. However, there are 
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three regions (long narrow cities), two of which are domestic (Mexico City and the rest 
of the country), while the third stands for the rest of the world. Labour is perfectly mobile 
between domestic regions, but not between domestic regions and the rest of the world. 
The transportation of goods within the country and imports is subject to “iceberg” costs 
as defined in section 3. However, there are two different cost parameters, one for 
transports within the country and one for imports. The second parameter includes trade 
barriers as well as ordinary transportation costs.24 The fraction of manufacturing goods 
provided by the rest of the world is exogenous. As described above, regions are modeled 
to capture the centrifugal forces due to land rents and commuting costs in 
agglomerations. 
The authors then investigate how the distribution of manufacturing within the country 
depends on international transportation costs. If these costs (trade barriers) are very high, 
there will be no international trade. In this case, if an industrial agglomeration exists, it 
will be the only supplier of manufacturing goods for consumption in the country. This 
will lead to the usual advantages due to positive externalities: manufacturers can supply 
local workers with cheaper goods than in the periphery, and the local demand is higher. 
A significant reduction of trade barriers reduces the importance of these centripetal 
forces: as the economy becomes more dependent on international markets, local demand 
is less important. In the region with more manufacturing, land rents and commuting costs 
are high. Low land rents and commuting costs attract firms to the other region because 
they can pay lower wages. Numerical simulations show that for very low international 
transportation costs, only the decentralized equilibrium will be sustainable, while for 
intermediate ranges, there are multiple stable equilibria: agglomerations in both regions 
and the decentralized equilibrium, where manufacturing is spread evenly across regions, 
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are possible. In this sense, trade liberalization tends to break up geographical 
concentration within an economy, as the empirical evidence suggests.25  
The argument sketched in this section have met with some skepticism (Henderson 1996, 
Isserman 1996). The critics claim that the result may depend crucially on some of the 
simplifying assumptions. For instance, real-world centers are usually not only 
manufacturing centers, but also government centers, financial centers, etc. Taking this 
into account, centers might benefit from trade liberalization. Also, they argue that the 
non-tradeability of agricultural goods matters. If this assumption were relaxed, peripheral 
areas might suffer from imports of agricultural goods, and trade liberalization may 
weaken these areas. Finally, treating the distance between both regions within the country 
with the rest of the world as equal may be misleading: for instance, much of the 
development of Northern Mexico after trade has been liberalized is of course related to 
the fact that the area is closer to the United States than the center of Mexico. 
Despite these qualifications, the paper by Livas-Elizondo and Krugman shows that the 
relations between trade liberalization and the internal geography of a country are 
potentially interesting. 
Expectations, History and Equilibrium Selection 
The dynamics of agglomeration in the basic model are driven by rather mechanistic 
assumptions). The share of any region in the manufacturing population increases 
gradually at a rate that is proportional to the present real wage differential. A gradual 
increase only makes sense if there are some costs of adjustment, otherwise workers 
should relocate whenever there is a non-zero wage differential. If such adjustment costs 
exist, however, rational workers should only move if they expect the differential to 
persist. Hence, expectations about future wage differentials are potentially an important 
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factor in the migration decisions. It is not obvious what the dynamics look like in a world 
where agents choose their locations based on expectations about future wage 
differentials. One possibility is the emergence of self-fulfilling prophecies. Future wage 
differentials depend on the migration decisions of other people and hence on their 
expectations about other agents. If everybody believes everybody else is moving, and 
positive externalities are important, these beliefs may be self-fulfilling. 
However, it is not clear under which conditions self-fulfilling prophecies might dominate 
over history. Under which circumstances is it possible that, even though a region has a 
relatively low share of manufacturing workers and a correspondingly low current wage, 
sufficiently many people believe that its share of manufacturing (and wage rates) will 
increase in the future, leading to a migration that confirms these beliefs? 
Krugman (1991c, appendix B) takes a first stab at these issues.26 He considers a model 
which is closely related to the basic two-region model, though it is not strictly speaking 
consistent with it. He assumes there are two regions with given total labour force. The 
wage differential between the two regions is proportional to the difference in labour force 
sizes, the idea being that the region with the greater labour force benefits more strongly 
from agglomeration externalities.27 At every moment of time, workers can decide whether 
or not to move locations. Workers face a moving cost function, which is convex in the 
rate of people that are moving at any moment in time. Rather than being concerned with 
present wage differentials, workers consider the discounted present values of future wage 
differentials, q. Incurring the costs of moving to another region can then be thought of as 
investing into an asset, the value of which is the present value of the expected wage 
differential. The assumptions give rise to a two-dimensional dynamic system in q and the 
share L1 of region 1 in the labour force. The two equations governing the system are 
intuitive. First, at any time, the cost of migration of a marginal worker should be equal to 
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the expected gain from changing location. Second, the rate of gain on the “asset” of being 
in one rather than in another should be equal to the market interest rate, which is among 
the exogenous parameters of the model. 
The dynamics of this model help to understand the factors that determine the relative 
importance of expectations and history. Suppose region 1 has a higher share of the 
manufacturing population than region 2, so that the present wage is higher in region 1. 
History will be said to dominate if this implies that the share of region 1 is increasing: in 
that case, the present wages determine expectations about future wages and hence 
migration decisions. 
The qualitative behavior of the system depends on exogenous parameters in the following 
way. First, self-fulfilling expectations can play a role only if the interest rate is 
sufficiently low. Otherwise, the future does not influence locational decisions 
significantly, so there is little scope for expectations to matter. Second, external 
economies have to be sufficiently strong to generate a high wage differential. With weak 
linkages between people’s decisions, there is not much room for self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Third, moving costs have to be sufficiently low. Otherwise, the economy will 
change slowly, so the present state of the world reveals what to expect for a long time. 
Therefore, it will take a long time for the sign of the wage differential to change, and, due 
to discounting, the present sign is most relevant for location decisions. 
Note that self-fulfilling expectations can matter only for initial population shares that are 
sufficiently close to the point of equal distribution. If the initial advantage of one region 
is sufficiently strong, and hence the present wage differential is high, this will determine 
the dynamics: everybody will eventually move to the dominant region.28 On the basis of 
his model, Krugman argues that self-fulfilling prophecies are unlikely to generate large-
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scale core-periphery shifts between regions, because the costs of moving factors rapidly 
are too high. Expectations are likely to be more important for the explanation of small-
scale events, such as changes in the relative importance of cities. 
Galì (1995) also considers a world where expectations matter, but he does not deal with 
the relative significance of history and expectations. He works with an overlapping 
generations model in an infinite horizon framework. For any given moment of time and 
given incomes of consumers, the problem is very similar to Krugman’s basic model 
without labour mobility. The first difference is that manufacturing is the only kind of 
economic activity; there is no agricultural sector. The second difference is that there is no 
trade between regions. Whichever region has the greater share of population will produce 
a greater number of goods, thus yielding greater utility to the local population. Every 
consumer has to make two intertemporal choices at the beginning of his lifetime (two 
periods). First, whatever his labour endowment in each period, he has to choose the first 
period savings level. Second, he chooses the region where he lives. This choice is 
irreversible; there are infinite moving costs. When making this choice, the agent has to 
consider the present and expected future distribution of the labour force. This is the only 
difference between the two regions. In terms of utility from consumption, the agent 
prefers to live in the more populated regions. However, this effect is partly offset by a 
congestion effect. The author assumes that the utility function has an additional term that 
stands for the disutility from congestion (traffic congestion, housing rents, crime, etc.).29 
Firms behave in a myopic fashion, maximizing profits in every period.  
For this model, Galì shows how the set of possible steady state equilibria depends on the 
relative importance of congestion effects and demand externalities. What is more 
important, he shows that stationary sunspot equilibria exist if expectations about the 
future are sufficiently important in the consumers’ location decisions. Broadly speaking, 
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this says that stochastic shifts in the expectations about the future distribution of 
preferences about locations can be self-fulfilling. This causes random fluctuations in the 
populations of the regions and hence in their relative well-being (compare Woodford 
1986). 
Summing up, self-fulfilling expectations can play a role in the development of 
agglomeration patterns, but this appears to be relevant mainly for the explanation of 
small-scale events. 
Heterogeneous Locations 
In the model described in section 3, history matters in the sense that small events can 
determine in which of two essentially identical regions an industry locates. However, 
given the initial identity of the regions, this is not important from an efficiency 
viewpoint. The economy may get locked into one of two equilibria; as neither site has a 
significant natural advantage, however, this is not necessarily inefficient.30 However, 
suppose that an agglomeration has developed. Suppose then that some kind of exogenous 
shock (technological or political) makes the new region more attractive, so that it would 
be more efficient for some or all of the production to move to the other region. 
Intuitively, it need not be the case that the economy moves to the new location: if the 
backward and forward linkages are strong enough, and firms and workers cannot 
coordinate a move to the new location, the economy might be locked in to the old 
location. While this issue has not been addressed in the monopolistic competition general 
equilibrium framework and will therefore not be dealt with in any more detail, it should 
be noted that there exist reduced-form models of such lock-in phenomena by Arthur 
(1990) and Rauch (1993a). 
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5 International Specialization, Backward and Forward Linkages 
In the models treated so far, agglomerations arise because firms benefit from being close 
to workers, and vice versa, with labor mobility reinforcing initial advantages of a 
location. Much of the traditional regional economics literature, however, emphasizes 
vertical linkages between different firms: upstream firms benefit from being close to their 
customers, and downstream firms benefit from being close to their suppliers. More 
recently, a second strand within the new economic geography literature has developed 
that focuses on such vertical linkages. While it shares with the original Krugman 
approach the emphasis on transportation costs, it does not rely on labor mobility. As a 
result, it becomes relevant to issues where the relevant regions are parts of different 
countries. I shall very briefly sketch this literature. 
The seminal paper was Venables (1996). Like Krugman, Venables dealt with the effects 
of decreasing trade costs on economic geography. He modified Krugman’s model in 
several ways. Most importantly, he considered two monopolistically competitive 
industries, which are in an upstream-downstream relationship. Also, there is no labor 
mobility. Nevertheless, concentration of the manufacturing industy sales in one of the 
two (ex-ante) identical regions may result: upstream firms benefit from being in locations 
with many downstream firms, because thus they can serve customers more cheaply. 
Conversely, downstream firms benefit from being in a location with many upstream 
firms, because this decreases input costs. 
In this setting, the effects of integration on the likelihood of agglomeration turn out to be 
non-monotone. As transportation costs decrease from high to medium, agglomeration 
becomes more likely by familiar arguments. As transportation costs decrease further, the 
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lower wage in the periphery increases its share of total sales of world trade, thus reducing 
the tendency for concentration. 
Krugman and Venables (1995) use a similar model to address the following puzzle. In the 
1960’s and 1970’s, globalization was regarded as deepening the difference between 
North and South, while more recently, the opposite point of view, that globalization hurts 
rich countries, has become more common. A variant of the story just given shows that 
both parties may be right. In earlier periods, when trade costs fell below a critical value, 
the world economy developed a core-periphery structure. Further falls of trade costs, as 
experienced more recently, mean that proximity is becoming less important and 
production costs matter more, which benefits the periphery and reduces the difference 
between core and periphery. 
Krugman and Venables (1996) use a variant of the Venables model to analyze whether 
increasing integration will make countries more or less similar in their industry structure. 
The two monopolistically competitive industries are no longer in a clear upstream-
downstream relationship. Instead, each industry produces an output that can be used for 
consumption and as an input. Each industry relies to some extent on the other industry as 
supplier, but it also uses intermediate goods produced in the sector itself as an input. 
Crucially, such intra-industry linkages are assumed to be more important than inter-
industry linkages: the cost share of inputs from the same industry is higher than the share 
from the other industry. Finally, while labour is internationally immobile; it can move 
between different sectors, and it moves towards the sector offering the higher present real 
wage.  
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In this setting, with high transportation costs, the industry structure is the same in both 
countries. For lower transportation costs, the stronger intra-industry linkages lead to 
specialization: firms of each industry concentrate in one of the two locations. 
The arguments are appealing, but it is not obvious whether they are borne out in reality. 
Krugman and Venables offer very limited evidence. They argue that the United States are 
obviously more integrated than Europe and have a more specialized industrial structure. 
On the other hand, e.g. Molle (1997) shows that for certain industry classifications and 
definitions of specialization, interregional specialization within Europe has been 
decreasing over the last few decades. Assuming that Europe has become more integrated 
in this period, this would seem to be hard to reconcile with the results of Krugman and 
Venables. At best therefore, the superficial empirical evidence in this case appears to be 
mixed. 
Puga and Venables (1996) have used arguments based on backward and forward linkages 
to explain the spread of industries across different Asian countries. Markusen and 
Venables (1996) have integrated geography models with earlier models of multinational 
activity. This is very natural because most reasonable discussions of multinationals rely 
crucially on the existence of trade costs. They use modifications of the above approach to 
analyze the causes and consequences of multinational activity.  
In brief, variants of the new economic geography models that rely on vertical linkages 
between firms rather than on labor mobility offer some promise for a better 
understanding of some important issues in international economics. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
In this section, I have surveyed recent literature which explains how positive economies 
of agglomeration can emerge, and what their consequences are. The following main 
conclusions emerge. 
First, history matters in the development of agglomerations. Cumulative processes 
generated by positive externalities can lead to the development of core-periphery 
structures even when no region has natural advantages. Second, transportation costs, the 
strength of scale economies and the importance of footloose industries are important 
factors determining whether such industrial concentration is likely to develop. Third, 
continuous changes in such parameters can lead to a discontinuous change in the 
equilibrium structure. Fourth, there are possible implications for trade: if positive 
externalities play a role, increasing economic integration affects both the distribution of 
manufacturing and the geographical distribution within the manufacturing sector. Fifth, 
there are interactions between the trade policy and the regional structure of an economy: 
increasing international integration may lead to decreasing concentration within the 
economy. Sixth, models with transportation costs are helpful to understand the causes 
and consequences of multinationals. 
The results were derived under rather specific assumptions on geography, market 
structure, etc. While this is enough to demonstrate the theoretical possibility of certain 
phenomena, it is nevertheless desirable to understand how robust the general insights are. 
Of course, some assumptions are crucial to the story: the existence of scale economies, of 
imperfect competition and transportation costs. Fortunately, these are among the more 
appealing assumptions of the models surveyed here. A more difficult issue is the exact 
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nature of market structure. It would be reassuring to know that the results do not depend 
on the specific model of monopolistic competition in an essential way. Without tractable 
alternative general equilibrium models of imperfect competition, one has to resort to at 
least some degree of faith in this matter. Modifications of other assumptions have been 
shown in section 4 to leave some of the qualitative results unaffected, but they may 
influence the size of effects. With significant congestion effects, for instance, the 
endogenous formation of agglomerations is still possible, but there is usually a non-
negligible share of manufacturing in the periphery. Some other modifications, however, 
are likely to lead to major changes. As argued in section 4, this includes the simplistic 
modelling of centers as pure manufacturing centers. 
The reception of the new literature by regional scientists has been mixed: while some 
complain about “... the failure of some new entrants to this debate to appreciate fully the 
previous literature”, others “... welcome the fact that others are interested in traditional 
regional topics ...” (Yezer 1995, p.154). Whether this renewed interest in economic 
geography is just a research fad or a development with a long-lasting impact, will depend 
mainly on the insights the field will give to other subdisciplines, such as trade theory or 
growth theory. So far, the most important contribution may not be a particular result, but 
rather the emphasis on a specific approach to economic problems. The mechanisms 
yielding the characteristic patterns discussed earlier are not unique to economic 
geography. Positive externalities and the resulting phenomena such as the existence of 
multiple equilibria and the importance of history have received some attention in other 
areas of economics.31  In some sense, therefore, the main achievement of the economic 
geography literature may not be a single original contribution, but rather the 
popularization of ideas that have deserved more attention than they got in the past. 
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For the concern with regional issues to have a long-lasting impact, it will also be 
important that economists approach these issues in other terms than the very special 
modelling framework discussed here. There are some encouraging signs that this is 
actually happening. For instance, numerous empirical papers covering regional topics 
have recently been published in top economics journals.32 In a different sense, there is 
less reason for optimism. The theoretical papers with regional issues that are published in 
general journals almost exclusively rely on variants of the Dixit-Stiglitz model. In the 
short run, this may be a blessing. Having a dominant modelling structure simplifies the 
comparability of different papers. In the long-run, the benefits of this restriction are 
debatable. Many important regional issues are hard to integrate in the Dixit-Stiglitz 
framework. To approach issues such as the relationship between geography and 
innovation, for instance, partial equilibrium approaches may be more tractable; with only 
one fashionable modelling approach we might end up not talking about such issues at all. 
Finally, of course, the new economic geography literature has one great shortcoming: so 
far, it has hardly generated any policy recommendations.33 Maybe it is wise not to jump to 
such conclusions before the theoretical and empirical foundations have been developed 
further. In the long run, however, the new economic geography will have to produce 
more results in this direction, or it will face the same criticism of policy irrelevance that 
has been raised against regional science in the tradition of Isard (1956) for some time 
(see Huntoon 1995, Isserman 1995). 
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* I am grateful to an anonymous referee and to Malte Faber, Switgard Feuerstein, Hans Gersbach, Peter 
Meusburger, Thomas Müller, Andreas Polk, Annette Schiller and Thomas Schröder for helpful comments. 
1For instance, why did the Ruhr and Saar regions’ share of German manufacturing employment decline in 
the nineteen eighties, while the corresponding shares of the southern states Baden-Württemberg and Bayern 
increased? 
2In a broader sense such advantages could also arise from regional differences in governmental policies, 
e.g., with respect to taxes, subsidies, etc. 
3Here and in the following transportation costs should more precisely be understood as “transfer costs” or 
“trade costs”, that is, they should include all the factors that drive a wedge between prices in different 
locations, for instance higher monitoring and marketing costs, and of course, when boundaries are relevant, 
import duties and non-tariff barriers to trade (see Baldwin 1994, p.43). 
4This is a fairly narrow, but not usual definition. There have been many other important recent contributions 
to economics with a strong regional component, both theoretical and empirical. For reasons of space and 
coherence, I shall confine myself to new economic geography in the more limited sense. 
5These arguments for localization have received a lot of attention in the empirical literature recently.  In 
particular, the importance of technological spillovers has been investigated by Jaffe (1989), Jaffe et al. 
(1993), Acs et al. (1994), Feldman (1994), Audretsch and Feldman (1996) and Audretsch and Stephan 
(1996). Also, more recently, additional reasons for localization have been analyzed in more detail.  For 
instance, Schulz and Stahl (1996) argue that retailers in differentiated markets may seek proximity to each 
other even though this increases competition: such proximity reduces search costs for consumers with 
differentiated tastes, and therefore makes it more likely that they search for a retailer at all.  A similar point 
has been made by Kim (1990): he argues that agglomeration generally reduces search costs on input 
markets.  Finally, Stahl and Varaiya (1978) consider the signalling effects of agglomerations: the fact that 
some firms do business in an area may be interpreted by others as a signal of a favorable business climate, 
and it may induce them to follow. 
6As Krugman (1992) points out, similar ideas are captured in the concept of a region’s market potential 
which is well-documented in geography. For instance, Harris (1954) describes this potential, a measure of 
the region’s attractivity for new manufacturing firms, as a weighted sum of the incomes of all regions, with 
weights that are decreasing with distance. As income depends positively on the presence of other 
manufactures, manufacturing attracts manufacturing. 
7Hoover was also well aware of this (e.g. Hoover 1948, ch.7) 
8Hotelling models that are familiar from the Industrial Organisation emphasize another centrifugal force: 
the desire of firms to stay away from others in order to reduce competition (d’Aspremont et al. 1979) 
9Without increasing returns, firms could produce the demand of each region locally without sacrificing 
scale advantages. 
10For instance, he developed a simple transportation cost argument which explains some degree of intra-
industry trade. 
11A fully satisfactory treatment would include transportation activities as an input supplied by profit-
maximizing agents in the economy, with transportation cost as an endogenous variable; see Ohlin (1933, 
ch. 8) for some thoughts on this issue. 
12For a discussion of this assumption, see section 4. 
13Essentially, with a low elasticity of substitution, consumers value variety highly. Hence, firms will 
respond by producing a great number of varieties, and they will therefore forsake economies of scale. More 
precisely, free entry implies that price equals average costs. Profit maximization implies that the price is 
obtained from marginal costs by multiplication with the mark-up factor, which can be shown to be 
σ /(σ − 1) .  Hence, the ratio of average costs to marginal costs equals σ /(σ − 1)  (see Krugman 1991c, 
p.104).  
 
14Myrdal (1957, p.28) argues similarly, but points out the abolishment of tariffs after Italian unification 
instead of a reduction of transportation costs in general. 
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15For instance, transportation costs should not be too high, so that it is possible to serve both locations from 
one place. 
16See also Hoover 1948 (ch.9) and Fuchs 1962 for detailed empirical work on these issues. 
17There are of course competing explanations, the simplest one of which relies on initial asymmetries 
between regions.  For instance, if each region has sufficiently strong natural advantages (resources or 
closeness to export markets) in some industries, at least these industries will stay in an otherwise 
underdeveloped region. 
18In principle, preferences for proximity to the center may also exist.  For instance, Matsuyama and 
Takahashi (1993) consider the idea that agglomeration advantages can result from the possibility of 
consuming non-traded local public goods that makes cities more attractive; they call this the “bright light -- 
big city” effect. 
19Recall that, in the two region model, workers moved towards the region offering the higher present real 
wage. 
20This resembles familiar results from partial equilibrium location theory (d’Aspremont et al. 1979, Tirole 
1988, ch.7). 
21Continua are not always the appropriate unit of analysis in the study of locations. To model the locational 
choices of firms who are facing existing regional distributions of manufacturing, networks consisting of 
finitely many points and arcs can be more appropriate choice sets (see Thisse 1993). 
22Krugman also shows that the results sketched below generalize to the more realistic case of a two-
dimensional object (the unit disk). 
23Fujita (1993) and Fujita and Krugman (1994) deal in more detail with non-monocentric equilibrium 
configurations. 
24For notational simplicity, transportation costs for exports are set to zero.  This does not affect the main 
results. 
25Note that this is not inconsistent with the Krugman model of section 3: There, a reduction in 
transportation costs between two regions could lead to an agglomeration in one of these regions.  Here we 
are considering the transportation costs betweeen the two regions and the rest of the world, so it is not 
surprising that the effect is different. 
26His model is based on Krugman (1991a), which considers the related problem of shifts between sectors 
within an region, given that there are Marshallian localization externalities in one of the sectors.  There is 
an error in this model, which does, however, not affect the qualitative conclusions presented here (see 
Fukao and Benabou 1993). 
27This formulation makes the model applicable to situations where agglomeration advantages come from 
arbitrary sources. In particular, we could interpret the model as describing the development in a single 
industry, where Marshallian externalities of localization are important. 
28The size of the interval of initial shares that is compatible with this kind of dominance of expectations 
depends on the three parameters (interest rate, strength of linkages, moving costs) in the same way as 
above. 
29This differs slightly from the model by Brakman et al (1994). Recall that there congestion resulted in  
negative externalities between firms. 
30It may of course still be relevant from an equity point of view. In the words of Rauch (1993 a, p. 844), 
“...certain regions or countries may be condemned to agricultural poverty, not because of lack of human and 
physical resources or poor governmental management, but simply because of bad luck”. 
31See for instance the development models of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), the product standard 
models of Farrell and Saloner (1985) and the technology adoption models of Arthur (1989).  Similar 
structures are also familiar from the natural sciences, where they come under the heading of ‘self-
organization’ (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).  
32For instance Glaeser et al. (1992), Ades and Glaeser (1995), Henderson et al. (1995), Audretsch and 
Feldman (1996), Ciccone and Hall (1996), Hanson (1996). 
33See, however, Martin and Rogers (1995). 
